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A narrative analysis into the psychological epistemology of conspiracy 
theorists. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Past psychological research regarding conspiracy theory endorsement has been 
conducted quantitatively. Therefore, psychologists have been unable to establish 
the personal views and opinions concerning individuals who believe conspiracy 
theories. Consequently, the current investigation was predominantly qualitative in 
nature. The aim of this study is to present a clear insight into the epistemology of 
individuals who believe in conspiracy theories. This aim was achieved by recruiting 
22 participants to fill out a Likert Scale questionnaire, which asked about the 
individual’s general conspiratorial thinking. A score was gathered from each 
participant and if the individual gained over 50% on the questionnaire they were 
invited to take part in a semi-structured interview. 10 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with both students and the general public. Through employing 
thematic analysis, four themes were identified; Definitions, Negative Connotations, 
Questioning and Endorsement Reason. The current study identified aspects of 
conspiracy theory endorsement which both agreed and disagreed with past 
research. Further research should take a qualitative standpoint when conducting 
explorations as new information and perspectives are gained, creating new 
information and knowledge regarding this topic area. 
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Introduction 
Belief in conspiracy theories seems to be widespread (Imhoff and Bruder, 2014) and 
growing rapidly with the aid of the Internet (Brotherton and French, 2014). Oliver and 
Wood (2014a) conducted four nationwide surveys, demonstrating that over 50% of the 
American public believe in a minimum of one conspiratorial narrative. However, with 
the large endorsement of conspiracy theories, it is astonishing that such little research 
has been conducted into the reasons for belief in conspiracy theories (Sustein and 
Vermeule, 2009). Due to this limited research, it is not shocking that psychologists do 
not agree upon a sole definition for the expression ‘conspiracy theory’ (Dagnall et al, 
2015; Drinkwater et al, 2012). Nonetheless, there seems to be a consensus 
throughout the various definitions. The common explanation of a conspiracy theory is, 
a secret plan by multiple authoritative individuals, with the intention to achieve 
malevolent and sinister goals (Abalakina-Paap et al, 1999; Brotherton and French, 
2014; Dagnall et al, 2015; Moulding et al, 2016; Prooijen, 2016; Swami and Furnham 
et al, 2016; Swami and Weis et al, 2016; Wood, 2016a; Wood and Douglas, 2013; 
Wood et al, 2012) through deception of the general public (Wood and Douglas, 2013).  
 
The definition of a conspiracist seems to branch off the explanation of a conspiracy 
theory as the two are neither dependent on, nor independent of each other. Individuals 
who endorse conspiracy theories are thought to; hold counterproductive opinions and 
produce socially counterproductive actions (Prooijen, 2016), frequently create 
associations between events which previously appeared to be unconnected (Parker, 
2001) and consider it their responsibility to expose the truth to the rest of the world 
(Moulding et al, 2016). 
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Although the research into reasons for conspiracy endorsement is narrow, many of 
the investigations demonstrate that believers of one conspiracy are highly likely to 
believe other conspiracy theories (Brotherton et al, 2013; Gebauer et al, 2016). 
Interestingly, this seems to be the case, even if the conspiracy theories are 
contradictory of one-another (Imhoff and Bruder, 2014; Prooijen, 2016; Wood and 
Douglas, 2013; Wood et al, 2012). For example, Imhoff and Bruder (2014) state how 
individuals who believe that Princess Diana was assassinated by the Royal Family are 
also likely to believe that Princess Diana faked her own death. Due to this finding, 
psychologists believe that individuals must have a predisposition to endorse 
conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, psychologists have been unable to detect a single 
reason as to why certain individuals are more inclined to believe conspiracy theories 
over others.  
 
Intolerance to Ambiguity  
It has been suggested that one reason why individuals may endorse conspiracy 
theories is due to a lack of information and intolerance to ambiguity. It is believed that 
conspiracy theories can offer a simplistic explanation regarding multifaceted events 
around the world. Therefore, these simplified descriptions may draw the attention of 
individuals who favour cognitive simplicity over complexity (Abalakina-Paap et al, 
1999; Swami and Weis et al, 2016). Abalakina-Paap et al (1999) continue to imply that 
individuals may find it easier to believe conspiracy theories instead of facing the 
ambiguities within the world. Therefore, individuals who would rather not analyse the 
reasons why major world events take place, may be more accepting of conspiracy 
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theories as they propose a ready-made convenient cause for the events which might 
otherwise appear undecipherable.  
 
Nevertheless, Jolley and Douglas (2014b, cited in Moulding et al, 2016) discovered 
that those who were exposed to information regarding governmental conspiracy 
theories had less inclination to engage in politics. Suggesting that individuals who had 
access to information were less motivated to research the subject matter. The 
contradiction between past research introduces the issue of establishing cause and 
effect. It is clear that psychologists have been unable to identify whether a belief in 
conspiracy theories causes a lack of information to be sought out, or whether a lack 
of information availability, and a high level of ambiguity causes a belief in conspiracy 
theories.  
 
Need for an Explanation  
In relation to an intolerance, psychologists have attributed belief in conspiracy theories 
to a “need-for-an-explanation” (Moulding et al, 2016:346). Knight (2006, cited in 
Drinkwater et al, 2012) declares that unconventional theories may develop due to a 
desire to comprehend the cause and consequences of prominent events. Numerous 
psychologists have also argued that a reason for the mass endorsement in conspiracy 
theories may be due to wanting to regain control and be able to predict future events 
(Imhoff and Bruder, 2014). Furthermore, Prooijen (2016) introduces the idea of 
subjective uncertainty as a predictor of conspiracy theory belief. Subject uncertainty 
encourages a sense-making process, which is targeted at understanding complicated 
and multifaceted societal events. This is because the sense-making process aims to 
restore the individual’s perception of the world. However, Gebauer et al (2016) state 
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that although the amount of information that an individual receives can influence their 
belief in conspiracy theories, the individual’s predisposition to conspiratorial beliefs will 
affect whether the conspiracy theory is accepted or rejected, due to the individual’s 
worldview. This demonstrates that there must be an underlying susceptibility to 
conspiratorial beliefs, regardless of the amount of information available to them.  
 
Reality Testing  
Psychologists have suggested that a deficit in an individual’s reality testing may be an 
underlying explanation for why the individual endorses conspiratorial theories. 
According to Irwin (2004), reality testing is an individual’s inclination to analytically 
assess viewpoints and theories, as a result of the individual’s pre-existing general 
knowledge and personal experience (Irwin, 2004; Langdon and Coltheart, 2000). 
Drinkwater et al (2012) conducted a study on the relationship between reality testing 
deficits and the support of conspiracy theories. A correlation between the two was 
established using the IPO-RT and a conspiracy theory belief self-report Likert Scale. 
Drinkwater et al (2012) found that high levels in reality testing deficits were associated 
with a lower belief in official explanations. However, this correlation only accounts for 
thirteen percent of the different influences for belief in conspiracy theories; suggesting 
that other aspects must impact an individual’s endorsement of conspiracies. 
Therefore, Drinkwater et al (2012) propose that the effect that probabilistic reasoning 
has on conspiratorial belief should be studied.  
 
Conjunction Fallacy  
The conjunction fallacy is defined as a particular error in a person’s probabilistic 
reasoning, which results in the individual overestimating the likelihood of co-occurring 
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events. Moreover, the representativeness heuristic may influence an individual’s 
involuntarily adoption of a conjunction fallacy (Brotherton and French, 2014). The 
representativeness heuristic, in regards to conspiracy theories, demonstrates how an 
individual can be unintentionally and biasedly accepting of an explanation (Moulding 
et al, 2016), if the significance of the explanation is equivalent to the significance of 
the event. Brotherton and French (2014) examined the association between the 
quantity of conjunction fallacy errors and anomalistic phenomena belief, specifically 
conspiracy theories. The findings demonstrated that the individuals who committed 
more conjunction fallacy errors also displayed a higher belief and acceptance of 
different conspiracy theories. Falling victim to the conjunction fallacy, due to an 
unconscious need to satisfy the representativeness heuristic, indicates that there is a 
deficiency in the logical reasoning of conspiracists. This, in combination with reality 
testing deficits (Drinkwater et al, 2012), implies that conspiracists are susceptible to 
conspiracy theories belief due to maladaptive personality traits.  
 
Personality Traits  
The notion that conspiracy theory belief can have negative effects both socially and 
politically (Brotherton et al, 2013; Brotherton and French, 2014; Moulding et al, 2016; 
Swami and Weis et al, 2016) may have prompted the perception that conspiratorial 
beliefs must be associated with psychopathology (Swami and Furnham et al, 2016; 
Swami and Weis et al, 2016), specifically schizotypy (Darwin et al, 2011; Wood and 
Douglas, 2013). Results from a correlation were consistent with past research which 
investigated the relationship between schizotypy and conspiracy theory belief (Swami 
and Weis et al, 2016).  
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In keeping with the notion that conspiracy theory belief is caused by psychopathology, 
psychologists have argued that paranoia plays a large role in this (Brotherton et al, 
2013; Hofstadter, 1996; Moulding et al, 2016; Swami and Weis et al, 2016). 
Nonetheless, according to Oliver and Wood (2014a) the declaration of belief in 
conspiracy theories is thought to be merely a different type of political discussion; one 
that allows for interpretation of public events. Therefore, some psychologists have 
recognised that there are negative connotations attached to ‘a conspiracist’ or ‘a 
conspiracy theory’. Bale (2007) states how even when a belief in conspiracy theories 
is articulated with a cautious approach and is verified by trustworthy evidence, it is still 
seen as a taboo subject and manages to exceed the boundaries of acceptable 
discourse. When analysing online forums, which discuss both for and against 
comments regarding conspiracy theories, Wood and Douglas (2013) found that few 
people were willing to name themselves ‘a conspiracist’ and to attach the term 
‘conspiracy theory’ to their ideas. Furthermore, Wood (2016b) states that labelling an 
explanation a conspiracy theories, may make the explanation less believable as it is 
then associated with the stereotype of paranoia.  
 
The association between conspiracy theory belief and psychopathology is large 
amongst psychologists and can lead to negative stereotypes about conspiracists. 
However, numerous other psychologists have claimed that psychopathology alone 
cannot simply be a cause of conspiracy theories endorsement (Dagnall et al, 2015; 
Drinkwater et al, 2012) as the extensive support for conspiracy theories is prevalent 
throughout various communities and populations (Dagnall et al, 2015; Prooijen, 2016; 
Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009; Oliver and Wood, 2014b). It has been said that 
concluding advocacy of conspiracy theories to be related to psychopathology only is 
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over simplified. Drinkwater et al (2012) highlight that using selective data to process 
and question the accuracy and validity of official accounts, requires a level of logical 
and successful analytical processing. Therefore, psychopathology alone cannot be 
attributed to conspiracy theory belief.  
 
Obscured Epistemology 
Drinkwater et al (2012) identify that, although the wide endorsement of conspiracy 
theories cannot be caused by psychopathology, issues may arise when individuals 
accept alternative explanations without adequate evidence to support the explanation. 
This brings about the concept of a “crippled epistemology” (Sunstein and Vermeule, 
2009:211), which occurs as people can only acquire a limited quantity of information 
and a great deal of that information will be incorrect. Nevertheless, this viewpoint 
proposes that conspiratorial thinkers may be acting logically regarding the information 
that is available to them (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). This is because, when society 
is denied information about the world events occurring around them their civil rights 
and civil liberties are taken away. Therefore, there is a higher chance of people finding 
reasons to accept conspiracy theories. This implies that there is no deficit in their 
analytical processing (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). This presents an explanation 
for belief in conspiracy theories as it emphasises how the belief in conspiracy theories 
may purely be a consequence of a shortage of information concerning a specific topic.  
 
Epistemological Standpoint 
As declared previously, pre-existing knowledge and experiences can influence an 
individual’s reality testing (Drinkwater et al, 2012). This prior knowledge and 
experience can also impact an individual’s epistemological worldview and ontological 
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claims. People appear to have a common propensity to support information that is in 
agreement with their own beliefs and reject alternative information that opposes these 
beliefs (Gebauer et al, 2016). Hartman and Newmark (2012:449) attribute “motivated 
reasoning” where individuals may process information biasedly and endorse 
information which support or link to their prior values and attitudes. Evidence for the 
influence of motivated reasoning is seen in a convergent of results from an Explicit 
questionnaire and an Implicit Association Test which demonstrated that within memory 
certain concepts are strongly associated. An individual may not be aware of these 
associations, as these implicit associations automatically come to mind with no 
conscious attempt (Hartman and Newmark, 2012).    
After consideration of past research into the motivations and explanations for 
conspiracy theory assertion, it is clear that an agreement has not yet been achieved. 
Therefore, the current study aims to present a clear insight into the epistemology of 
individuals who believe in conspiracy theories.  
 
Research Question 
The research questions investigated were:  
1. How does a conspiracist’s epistemology impact upon the rationale for their 
belief of conspiracy theories? 
2. How do conspiracy theorists define a conspiracy theory? 
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Methodology  
Design  
Although this exploration was focused on qualitative data analysis, the investigation 
did feature a quantitative questionnaire which was employed to recruit participants for 
the semi-structured interview. Skinner et al (2004) describes how qualitative 
investigations are advantageous as they allow the researcher to analyse the 
participants’ personal opinions and experiences and the deeper meanings and 
reasons for these. Therefore, in relation to the topic of conspiracy theories a semi-
structured qualitative approach was appropriate. This is because semi-structured 
interviews allow participants to elaborate on their opinions and experiences through 
the use of two-way face-to-face communication and open-ended questions (Stuckey, 
2013). This consequently permits researchers to conduct a holistic analysis of the 
interviewees epistemology (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  The research was 
conducted from an interpretivist epistemology as the beliefs of the participants are 
relative to each individual.  
 
Participants  
Recruitment   
The participants consisted of males and females over the age of 18, all situated in the 
North West of England, including both university students and the general public. 
Students were approached on the university campus grounds and asked to take part 
in the investigation. However, the participants from the general public were recruited 
through a previously established acquaintance with the researcher or through 
networking with other researchers. Each possible participant received a participation 
information sheet (Appendix 1) detailing the purpose of the study and the various 
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aspects involved. For the individuals who agreed to take part, a consent form 
(Appendix 2) was provided. Every participant completed the questionnaire (Appendix 
3) which consisted of a series of Likert Scale questions, creating an individual score. 
Participants were split into potential conspiracy theory believers and non-believers by 
their score on the questionnaire. Participants with a score of over 50% (55 out of 110) 
were classed as potential conspiracy theory believers and were asked if they would 
like to take part in the focus interview. Consequently, the questionnaire was employed 
as a material in order to gain appropriate participants for the interview.  
 
The Likert Scale questionnaire distributed to each participant was a combination of 
two previously published Likert Scale questionnaires by Brotherton et al (2013) and 
Drinkwater et al (2012). As the questionnaire was used as a recruitment tool for the 
latter part of the investigation, it questioned participants on their general attitudes 
towards conspiracy theories using non-specific statements, such as “conspiracy 
theories accurately depict real life events” (Drinkwater et al, 2012) and “the 
government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity” 
(Brotherton et al, 2013). Out of the 20 items on the questionnaire, Drinkwater et al 
(2012) originally created 5. During the initial study, the reliability of the Conspiracy 
Theory (CT) Scale was established to have satisfactory internal reliability. The 
researchers also correlated the Official CT Scale and Alternative CT Scale with the 
CT Scale, resulting in a significant negative correlation (α=.72). This demonstrates 
that belief in conspiracy theories is associated with a greater acceptance of alternative 
accounts and a lowered belief in official accounts. The 15 items which originated from 
the study conducted by Brotherton et al (2013) were assessed for validity and 
reliability. In order to test the criterion-related validity of the Generic Conspiracist 
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Beliefs (GBC) Scale, a multiple regression was conducted. Additionally, in terms of 
reliability, a test-retest was also conducted on the GBC. Time 1 and Time 2 were 
established to have a positive correlation, demonstrating that the GBC has a high 
reliability (α=.93).  As a result of their previously established high reliability and validity, 
the researcher employed the use of these questionnaires, in order to indicate which 
members of the sample would be suitable to include in the interviews.  
 
Number of Participants  
Many researchers have an issue establishing how many interviews to conduct when 
carry out qualitative research. Mason (2010) suggest that this is because qualitative 
studies aim to centre on deep meaning and explanation, unlike quantitative research 
which focuses on statistical analysis. Therefore, it is challenging to determine the 
correct quantity of interviews to undertake. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) propose that 
carrying out less than 20 interviews can build rapport between the interviewer and 
interviewee as there is time to nurture and maintain an interpersonal relationship. 
However, other social science researchers determine the appropriate number of 
interviews due to saturation. Although, initially the term ‘saturation’ illustrated the 
quality of data rather than the size of the sample, more recently, saturation has been 
utilised in terms of ‘data saturation’ which aids researchers to gauge a suitable sample 
size and not data adequacy (Hennink et al, 2016). In order to establish when a study 
has reached data saturation Guest et al (2006) suggest that if the participants involved 
are a homogenous group saturation can be reached at around the 12 participants. 
Moreover, conducting few interviews is said to be justifiable when the respondents 
hold a high level of prior knowledge and understanding of the subject matter. Due to 
previous depth and breadth of knowledge that the interviewees hold, saturation would 
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be reached earlier; therefore, fewer participants are required (Romney et al, 1986). 
Consequently, by taking into account the suggestions of past studies, for this 
investigation the researcher chose to conduct 10 interviews. This is because the 
interviewees all scored over 50% on the questionnaire, indicating that they had 
previous knowledge of the subject area of conspiracy theories.  
 
Method  
Data Collection   
Although the questionnaire was initially conducted purely to recruit the correct 
participants for the interview, once the questionnaires were completed, the researcher 
decided to statistically analyse the results. At the end of the investigation, 22 
questionnaires were completed.  
 
The interview conducted was semi-structured in style. The use of semi-structured 
interviews was beneficial to this study as the researcher was able to plan certain 
questions prior to the interview resulting in a basic structure for the interview. However, 
semi-structured interviews also permit interviewees to express their opinions openly 
and freely and allows them to speak in-depth about the subject matter (Cohen and 
Crabtree, 2006). This is also aided by using open-ended questions, such as, “please 
describe in your own words what a conspiracy or a conspiracy theory is” (Appendix 5). 
Stuckey (2013) explains how a longer interview is advantageous as most questions 
are constructed during the interview as a response to what the interviewee has said. 
Therefore, the semi-structured interviews in this study lasted a minimum of 30 minutes, 
which gave the participant and researcher enough time for a two-way conversation, 
rapport to be built and for the interviewee to give detailed responses. Barriball and 
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While (1994) also express how semi-structured interviews nicely complement studies 
which focus on epistemological worldviews as the researcher is able to investigate 
topics initially conveyed by the respondent. For transcription, the interviews were 
audio recorded on a Dictaphone. Transcriptions were saved in a password protected 
file in order to retain the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants.  
 
After the questionnaire, any participants who were not eligible for the interview or 
declined the invite to the interview were given a debrief form (Appendix 4) detailing 
the part of the study they had taken part in and how to withdraw if they wished to. 
Participants involved in the interview were given a debrief form (Appendix 6) after the 
interview, describing both parts of the study and how to withdraw if they wished to.  
 
Data Analysis  
The quantitative questionnaire was statistically analysed in order to illustrate the range 
of results gathered from the various participants and the mean score gained on the 
questionnaire. Thematic analysis, a typology of narrative analysis, was used to 
analyse the interview transcriptions. Thematic analysis requires the systematic coding 
of significant aspects of the transcripts, organisation of those codes into themes, the 
review and defining of each theme and then the analysis of the themes in relation to 
past research and the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The transcribes 
were analysed using two different features of thematic analysis; the frequency that 
each code appears in each transcript and the underlying meanings of the themes and 
individual codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Joffe and Yardley, 2004). 
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Ethical Considerations  
Informed consent (Appendix 2) was gained from each participant, regarding 
anonymity, confidentiality and withdrawal procedures, before they took part in the 
questionnaire and/or the interview. Participants were made aware that pseudonyms 
will be used for any direct quotes used from the interviews. It was stated throughout 
the investigation that participants were able to withdraw from the study by providing 
the researcher with their unique code which were wrote on the questionnaire and 
stated on the audio recordings of the interviews. Details of how to withdraw from the 
study were given in the information sheet (Appendix 1), consent form (Appendix 2) 
and debrief forms (Appendix 4 and Appendix 6).  
 
In order to retain the researchers and the participant’s safety, interviews were held in 
mutually agreed public locations. Also, although the study did not pose any immediate 
or physical harm to the participants, the topics covered could have caused slight stress 
and mental suffering, as some conspiracy theories include distressing events. 
Therefore, each participant received contact details of a counselling service which 
they could contact if they felt they needed guidance. The contact details were clearly 
marked on the debrief forms (Appendix 4 and Appendix 6) and information sheet 
(Appendix 1).  
 
The study adhered to the British Psychological Society (BPS) Ethical guidelines and 
Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) Ethics by completing the Application for 
Ethical Approval Form (AEAF) (Appendix 7) 
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Analysis and Discussion 
From the Likert Scale the researcher was able to derive a range of scores and the 
mean score gained from the questionnaire. The lowest score received on the 
questionnaire was 31 (28%) and the highest score obtained was 102 (93%). The mean 
score on the questionnaire was 65.6 (60%).  
 
Through the use of open-ended questions, participants gave their opinions on various 
subjects and aspects of conspiracy theories. By employing thematic analysis, various 
codes were identified throughout each transcription, creating subthemes. The similar 
subthemes were then grouped together, forming the overarching themes; Definitions, 
Negative Connotations, Questioning and Endorsement Reason.  
 
Theme 1: Definitions  
The theme of Definitions, explores the various responses that the interviewees had 
when asked what a conspiracy theory or conspiracist was. This is in relation to the 
second research question. The subthemes which were combined to form this theme 
were; Alternative Explanations, Umbrella Term and Critical/Analytical Thinkers.  
 
Alternative Explanation 
The participants were asked to explain what they personally believed a conspiracy 
theory was. The interviewees were all found to describe a conspiracy theory in 
different ways. This is demonstrated with the following quotes:  
 
“A conspiracy is when one or more people attempt to conceal something that 
other people would view as being bad, for their own benefit. Conspiracy 
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theories are the ideas behind it, the possibility that it could be true, that 
governments or people conceal things from the public.” (Steve:5-8) 
 
“…it answers questions that don’t really tie in with what, shall we say the 
government is telling us” (Tombstone:5-6) 
 
“It’s about an event that’s happened and it’s not as straightforward as the 
information that is being given to the public” (Shannon:10-11) 
 
The variety in explanations for what a conspiracy theory is gives support for the fact 
that psychologists are unable to agree upon an academic definition for a conspiracy 
theory (Dagnall et al, 2015; Drinkwater et al, 2012). This is because each individual 
has a varying view on what makes a conspiracy theory and each person classifies 
conspiracy theories in various ways. However, most participants did express a 
consensus regarding a secret and involving the government, which provides support 
for the harmonious explanation given by various psychologists.  
 
Interestingly, one participant aligned with past research by stating that a conspiracy 
theory is “a counter explanation for a prominent world event” (Eric:5). This reinforces 
the statement by Oliver and Wood (2014a) who express that conspiracy theories are 
simply a type of political examination which allow public events to be interpreted 
differently. From the quotes provided, it is clear that some conspiracy theories are 
thought to be nothing more than alternative explanations for events which take place, 
compared to what is classed as the official explanation given by authoritarian bodies.  
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Umbrella Term 
The participants expressed how the terms conspiracy theory and conspiracist were 
very wide subjects and how each conspiracy theory and conspiracist is different: 
 
“[a conspiracy theory is] such a wide subject and it covers all aspects of life” 
(Tombstone:210) 
 
“…it’s not really a homogenous type, there are different types of people and 
ideologies that will lead to that umbrella term of a conspiracist” (Eric:48-49) 
 
“you know it becomes part of the great problem that lumps under the heading 
of conspiracy theories” (Amy:533-534) 
 
The notion that all conspiratorial thinkers must all hold the same predisposition to 
endorse conspiracy theories (Gebauer et al, 2016) may be incorrect. It is thought by 
the participants, that the terms conspiracy theory and conspiracist are merely overall 
headings for a group of unique events and individuals. Therefore, as each individual 
and world event is different, then people may become conspiratorial thinkers for 
various reasons, highlighting that perhaps there are multiple aspects and motivations 
for an individual to begin believing conspiracy theories. This could establish why 
psychologists have been unable to identify one underlying concept for why people 
believe conspiracy theories and also why a definition has not been agreed upon 
(Dagnall et al, 2015; Drinkwater et al, 2012).  
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Critical/Analytical Thinker 
When explaining what a conspiracy theory was many of the interviewees also clarified 
what they believed a conspiracist was. 
 
“… they can be critical thinkers or analytical thinkers…” (Shannon:34) 
 
“a conspiracist can be someone who’s just a very critical thinker. Someone who 
looks beyond what they’re being told at the moment” (Cerberus:27-28) 
 
In comparison to the aforementioned research, the interviewees believe that 
individuals who believe conspiracy theories are critical and analytical thinkers. 
Abalakina-Paap et al (1999) and Swami and Weis et al, (2016) both state how 
conspiracists prefer cognitive simplicity over complexity, also it was found that 
conspiratorial thinkers were less inclined to be involved in politics (Jolley and Douglas, 
2014b, cited in Moulding et al, 2016). However, in order for an individual to “think 
beyond the information that’s being given” (Shannon:33), they must be able to process 
multifaceted information and engage in the political information available to them. 
Therefore, this study contradicts past research regarding the intolerance to ambiguity 
approach to conspiratorial thinkers.  
 
Theme 2: Negative Connotations 
In relation to the interviewees describing a conspiracist as a critical or analytical 
thinker, many of the respondents also refused to refer to themselves as a conspiracist. 
One participant described themselves as “an independent thinker” (Charles:99), 
another referred to themselves as “a critical thinker” (Cerberus:50).  From the quotes 
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provided below, this choice of self-identification may be due to the negative 
connotations attached to being a conspiracist.  
 
“…it often has negative connotations… well it’s a typical type of stereotyping… 
when you think of a conspiracist, you probably think of a small-minded person, 
who’s part of a minority group, who’s holding some silly, ridiculous, 
preposterous, obscured ideas” (John:188-191) 
 
“I wouldn’t give myself the name ‘conspiracist’, partly because I think there is a 
little bit of a negative connotations about being classed as a conspiracist” 
(Shannon:47-49) 
 
According to Bale (2007), even expression of conspiracy theory belief that is supported 
by reliable evidence is seen as a taboo area of discussion. Moreover, Wood and 
Douglas (2013) found that even online where a person’s presence is anonymous, 
individuals who supported conspiracy theories did not want to be labelled a 
conspiracist. This study defends Bale’s (2007) claim and Wood and Douglas’s (2013) 
findings as the participants did not want to name themselves as conspiracist in order 
to avoid the negative associations. Alternatively, compared to information given by 
various psychologists regarding paranoia (Brotherton et al, 2013; Hofstadter, 1996; 
Moulding et al, 2016; Swami and Weis et al, 2016), participants expressed a 
disagreement that people who believe conspiracies are paranoid. This can be seen 
with the quote:  
 
“I think most people feel a sort of ambivalence or alternately a little bit of  
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cynicism, definitely not paranoia” (John:70-71).  
 
Theme 3: Questioning 
As support of Sunstein and Vermeule (2009), who recognise that a lack of information 
can result in society feeling like they are being deprived of civil rights, one participant 
describes questioning the official explanations of major events as “a democratic right” 
(Eric:203). Therefore, the theme Questioning, explores the different views that the 
participants had in relation to questioning official and conspiratorial explanations of 
world events. The theme is constructed through the subthemes; Healthy Questioning 
and Disbelief Is Not Evidence.  
 
Healthy Questioning 
The participants believe that the amount of questioning which they take part in is 
healthy; one participant says that “anything that allows people to… think out of the 
box, as long as they’re not going crazy with it then it’s a good thing” (Shannon:90-92). 
Many of the interviewees also expressed how they believed that a “kind of healthy 
questioning is probably a good thing” (Charles:110-111).  
 
“I think normal people believe in conspiracy theories through life experience 
and through just having a questioning nature… you’re either very trusting of 
authority or you’re questioning and I think everybody should be questioning” 
(Steve:305-307) 
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“if you immediately say ‘no I don’t believe that’ straight away then it’s just as 
bad as believing everything straight away but in the opposite way” 
(Charles:446-447) 
 
This viewpoint from the interviewees opposes past research into conjunction fallacy. 
Conjunction fallacy reveals how people endorse conspiracy theories due to their 
unconscious need to satisfy the representativeness heuristic (Moulding et al, 2016). 
The quotes provided above contradict the concept of conjunction fallacy as the 
participants clearly state how they question what they are told, but do so with 
conscious effort rather than an unconscious desire.  
 
Disbelief Is Not Evidence  
The subtheme Disbelief Is Not Evidence relates to when the participants frequently 
identify that they also question the truthfulness of conspiracy theories as well as official 
accounts. This counteracts the concept of an intolerance to ambiguity and a need for 
an explanation. Many participants expressed how they believed that simply accepting 
one theory as truthful because they disagree the other is a flawed approach. 
 
“… they find that doubt as being justification for adopting another theory for 
which there’s little evidence” (John:61-62)  
 
“…but when people won’t look into things that annoys be because I think 
ignorance is not bliss…” (Cerberus:340-341).  
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“I don’t know what happened, I just know that what they’re telling us isn’t true” 
(Steve:179-180) 
 
Past research has indicated that conspiracy believers have a “need-for-an-
explanation” (Moulding et al, 2016:346). However, the participants in this study gave 
the impression that they do not use disbelief of the official account as evidence in 
support of conspiracy theories. Therefore, they seemed to prefer to recognise that 
they do not know the truth rather than endorse a theory which may be incorrect. This 
contradicts previous research, which implies that alternative explanations may arise 
due to a need to understand the sources and consequences of major events (Knight, 
2006, cited in Drinkwater et al, 2012).  
 
Theme 4: Endorsement Reason 
In relation to the first research question, the theme Endorsement Reason investigates 
how an individual’s worldview and epistemology can impact their endorsement level 
of conspiracy theories, from the view point of the believer. Past research has 
suggested that people endorse conspiracy theories due to various reasons, from an 
intolerance to ambiguity (Abalakina-Paap et al, 1999; Swami and Weis et al, 2016) to 
psychopathology (Swami and Furnham et al, 2016; Swami and Weis et al, 2016). 
However, it seems that the participants in this study all have various reasons as to 
why they endorse conspiracy theories. 
 
“…believability and plausibility, those sorts of factors” (John:42) 
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‘I’ll leave it a little bit or I’ll see if someone else from another news source says 
the same thing or I’ll Google it and see if it comes up…” (Erin:116-117) 
 
“I think it’s the prevalence of the conspiracy theory that matters” (Eric:112-
113).  
 
The quotes provided above give just a few of the several explanations as to why an 
individual may believe conspiracy theories. Many participants also spoke of how 
experience and personal growth had influenced their belief in conspiracy theories due 
to gaining new knowledge about the way in which the world works. It is clear that the 
individual’s in this study are influenced to believe conspiracy theories due to their 
epistemological standpoint on the world. For example, one participant says “look into 
things, investigate, because you will be lied to your entire life, you will be manipulated” 
(Steve:314-315).  
 
A “crippled epistemology” (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009:211) occurs when an 
individual is acting logically to a lack of or incorrect information. However, from the 
previous theme, it is clear that the participants do not endorse conspiracy theories 
simply because they are lacking in information, as they are willing to acknowledge that 
disbelieving one theory is not evidence for another theory. Therefore, although 
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009:211) investigated the influence of a “crippled 
epistemology”, further research should be conducted into the various epistemologies 
that conspiracy believers hold. This is because, the participants held varying views on 
the world and the reasons as to why they endorse conspiracy theories.  
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This study has offered an insight into the ontology and epistemology of a conspiracy 
theory believer through the use of qualitative methodologies and thematic analysis. 
The research aims were appropriately and successfully explored throughout this 
investigation. The exploration also uncovered new information and knowledge in 
addition to the research aim. However, as the questionnaires were only analysed 
basically, through the range and means, future research should look at conducting a 
mix-methodology investigation in further detail. Statistically analysing questionnaires 
and conducting interviews would give future research different perspectives and may 
in form researchers of whether the answers an individual gives on an anonymous 
questionnaire are the same as the responses given in an interview. Forthcoming 
studies should also aim to conduct more than 10 interviews, as this may give a broader 
range of opinions, creating new knowledge and information from the view point of a 
conspiracy theory believer. This study interviewed participants who gained a score of 
over 50% on the questionnaire. However, future research should aim to establish at 
what point an individual can be classed as a conspiracy theory believer, in order to 
verify that the opinions given in the interviews are specifically from a conspiratorial 
thinker’s point of view.   
 
The themes throughout this analysis are all closely linked to one-another. The themes; 
Definitions, Negative Connotations and Questioning are all in relation to a person’s 
view of the world and the theme, Endorsement Reason explores the reasons in which 
an individual would believe a conspiracy theory. This implies that reasoning for 
conspiracy theory endorsement is closely linked to an individual’s epistemological 
standpoint. From the last theme, it is clear that each person’s reason for endorsing 
conspiracy theories is varied, therefore, perhaps psychologists, instead of looking for 
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one single explanation to clarify conspiratorial thinking, should look at further 
investigating differing epistemologies and how they can influence conspiratorial 
thinking. Psychologists should conduct further research into psychopathology as a 
reason for conspiracy theory belief, as the participants in this study were all logical in 
their approach to conspiracy theories. Therefore, many other conspiracy theory 
believers may also have the same rational and plausible approach to why they 
endorse conspiracy theories.  
 
Reflexive Journal  
The role of a reflexivity is frequently recognised as a vital strategy when generating 
new knowledge through the numerous and differing types of qualitative methodologies 
(Berger, 2015; Dowling, 2006). The purpose of a reflexive journal is to demonstrate 
an awareness that the researcher and the topic being investigated can continuously 
affect each other throughout the research process (Symon and Cassell, 2012). Within 
general research debates, reflexivity proposes that the researcher should participate 
in on-going critical self-evaluation and self-appraisal, in addition to continually 
acknowledging that they may affect the outcome of the research (Berger, 2015; 
Dowling, 2006).  
 
Due to frequently indulging in conspiratorial thinking myself, the research aims were 
created in relation to my own personal interests. Although many psychologists have 
expressed various reasons for why individual’s may endorse conspiracy theories, my 
curiosity was further reinforced when I realised that no qualitative research had been 
conducted. Therefore, as many of my peers and relatives also support conspiratorial 
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thinking, I was interested in establishing whether past research was correct in relation 
to a conspiracy theory believer’s own opinion. This is because every person’s 
experiences and world knowledge is varied in relation to conspiracies, hence each 
individual’s perspective regarding why they believe conspiracy theories, I believed 
would be different.  
 
As many of the participants and I had a pre-existing relationship, the interviews were 
much more relaxed than I initially thought they would be. This aided the study as 
rapport was easily established. Therefore, in-depth information was gathered with less 
effort, compared to the participants where pre-existing rapport was not present. 
However, this difference in acquaintance between the participants and I may have 
affected the analysis as varied depths of views were gathered which may have 
resulted in a less holistic analysis.  
 
Furthermore, as I myself tend to endorse conspiracy theories, my analysis of the 
interviews was perhaps biased as I may have interpreted a participant’s viewpoint in 
accordance with my own views. In order to avoid this, I often re-read my analysis and 
changed the coding many times. This helped with my final analysis as the themes that 
were established were specific, yet relevant to past research. Although some of what 
was mentioned during the interviews did align with my pre-existing ideas regarding 
conspiracy theory belief, I was presented with new concepts and opinions, widening 
my worldview. Therefore, from researching other people’s epistemological 
standpoints, I believe that my own epistemological standpoint has been influenced for 
the better. 
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